India at Tianjin: Modi’s SCO Gambit in a Multipolar World

When Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi landed in Tianjin for the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit on August 31, the symbolism was heavy. This was his first appearance at the Eurasian bloc’s gathering in seven years, and it came at a time when India faces unprecedented external pressures. On the surface, Modi’s schedule looked like another multilateral tour—the usual plenary speeches, bilateral meetings, photo opportunities. But the real story was elsewhere: a private meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping, another with Russian President Vladimir Putin, and the quiet but unmistakable message that India’s traditional strategy of working with everyone, everywhere, is running out of road.

The Tianjin summit is not just about the SCO. It is a litmus test for India’s foreign policy at a time when multipolarity itself is under strain. For two decades, New Delhi has thrived by hedging: buying oil from Russia, importing technology from China, trading heavily with the U.S., and simultaneously anchoring BRICS, the Quad, and bilateral partnerships across the world. But the tariff war unleashed by President Donald Trump against India, China’s hardening stance along the Himalayan border, and Russia’s deepening dependence on Beijing have all converged to force Modi into sharper choices. Tianjin may be remembered not for the SCO plenary speeches, but for what Modi decides in those closed rooms with Xi and Putin.

The SCO as a Stage

The SCO has long been dismissed in Western capitals as a “talk shop,” a Eurasian club led by China and Russia with little binding power. Yet this year’s Tianjin summit carried unusual weight. It came at a moment when global trade is fragmenting, the G20 has lost momentum, and blocs are becoming the main vehicles of influence. For China, the SCO is no longer about symbolism—it is about anchoring Eurasian states firmly in its orbit as the U.S. doubles down on alliances in the Indo-Pacific.

India’s presence, therefore, is significant. By showing up after years of coolness, Modi signals that New Delhi will not abandon the Eurasian stage to Beijing and Moscow. At the same time, India knows it is an uneasy partner—sharing space with Pakistan, sitting alongside regimes aligned more closely with China than with itself. For Modi, the SCO is not an embrace of Eurasian unity but a necessary performance: stay inside, shape the conversation where possible, and prevent the bloc from becoming a purely China-led strategic instrument.

Modi–Xi Reset

The Modi–Xi meeting is the most delicate of Tianjin’s sidelines. Relations between the two countries remain poisoned by the 2020 Galwan clash and continuing military standoffs along the Line of Actual Control. Trade, however, tells another story: China remains India’s largest goods trading partner. The paradox is stark—political distrust runs high, but economic dependency deepens.

In Tianjin, the two leaders reportedly discussed practical steps: resuming suspended flights, restoring the Mansarovar Yatra pilgrimage, and exploring mechanisms to reduce tensions at the border. None of this amounts to a breakthrough. But even small signals matter. For Modi, meeting Xi is about showing India can manage its differences with Beijing without either capitulating or escalating. For Xi, it is about portraying China as a responsible regional stabilizer at a time when Beijing’s global image is battered by economic slowdown and strained U.S. relations.

A true reset is unlikely. What Tianjin represents instead is a pragmatic pause: a willingness to keep lines open, reduce friction where possible, and buy time. India knows that full-scale confrontation with China would derail its development goals. China knows that pushing India too far into Washington’s embrace would be strategically costly. The reset, therefore, is about containment, not convergence.

The Putin Factor

If the Xi meeting was about de-escalation, the Putin meeting was about consolidation. Russia remains a central player in India’s strategic landscape, even as its war in Ukraine has pushed it into Beijing’s shadow. Moscow continues to supply energy at discounted rates, arms at scale, and diplomatic cover in multilateral forums.

For India, Russia provides resilience against Western pressure and a hedge against overreliance on the U.S. But the risks are clear: Moscow is no longer an independent pole—it is increasingly dependent on China. That complicates India’s calculus. Aligning too closely with Russia risks indirectly tying India to Beijing’s camp. Abandoning Russia risks losing a long-standing partner whose role in India’s military arsenal and energy security is still irreplaceable in the short term.

At Tianjin, Modi’s engagement with Putin was thus not just about bilateral deals—it was about preserving room for maneuver. As Trump’s tariffs squeeze India’s exports and Washington demands sharper alignment, New Delhi cannot afford to let Moscow drift completely into Beijing’s hands.

Between SCO and the Quad

India is now playing a high-stakes double game. On one hand, it deepens ties with the Quad—Australia, Japan, and the U.S.—positioning itself as a key Indo-Pacific counterweight to China. On the other, it participates in BRICS and the SCO, signaling solidarity with Eurasian partners and the Global South.

This “two tables” strategy has worked for years. But as global polarization accelerates, it is under stress. Washington increasingly expects New Delhi to move beyond hedging and embrace alignment. Beijing sees India’s Quad commitments as hostile. Moscow views India’s engagement with the U.S. as a dilution of historic ties.

The SCO summit in Tianjin is therefore more than a diplomatic calendar event. It is a stress test for India’s balancing act. Can New Delhi continue to hedge in a world that punishes ambiguity? Or will Modi be forced into sharper choices—choices that define not just India’s foreign policy, but its development trajectory for decades to come?

Final Thought

Modi’s Tianjin engagements reveal the contours of India’s new dilemma. The age of “strategic autonomy” that defined its foreign policy since the Cold War is giving way to an era of strategic prioritization. Hedging with everyone is no longer viable when tariffs, sanctions, and blocs dominate the global landscape.

India will not abandon the U.S. and the Quad, nor will it walk out of the SCO and BRICS. But it must decide where its true leverage lies and how to turn multipolarity from rhetoric into strategy. That means identifying core interests—technology access, energy security, border stability—and aligning partnerships accordingly, even if that means displeasing one camp or another.

Tianjin, then, is not about China or Russia. It is about whether India can still write its own script in a world of rigid blocs and sharp alignments. Multipolarity may survive as an idea, but its practice now demands choices. And those choices will determine whether India emerges as a shaper of the new order—or remains trapped between giants.

Dr Brian O. Reuben is the Executive Chairman of the Sixteenth Council