India as the Anchor of a Post-Brexit Global Strategy

Strategic Overview

In July 2025, Prime Minister Modi undertook his fourth official visit to the United Kingdom at the invitation of Prime Minister Keir Starmer. This sojourn marked a pivotal moment that saw the two leaders chart a decisive new course in UK-India relations that was defined by tangible deliverables rather than rhetorical aspirations. This distinctly new phase in their bilateral relationship signalled the elevation of India into a central pillar of London’s Indo-Pacific strategy through ambitious dialogue and the launch of transformative economic and security agreements.

In the post-Brexit global landscape, both the nations have reimagined the very foundations of their partnership as they have shifted toward a results-oriented agenda anchored in trade, defence co-development, and long-term institutional linkages. The July 2025 signing of the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) and the endorsement of the “India-UK Vision 2035” gave strategic substance to these ambitions, establishing clear benchmarks for joint innovation, investment, and security in a complex, multipolar order.

The trade deal is estimated to expand bilateral commerce beyond £40 billion annually which not only fulfills Britain’s search for high-growth markets but also advances India’s ambition to anchor global value chains through preferential market access and tariff reductions. Meanwhile, the Vision 2035 framework outlines detailed cooperation in semiconductors, critical minerals, clean energy, and defence co-development, translating summit declarations into practical, actionable commitments, and ensuring that the symbolism of Modi’s visit is substantiated by an enduring strategic architecture and the operational realities of the new partnership. These strategic milestones have injected new momentum into the bilateral agenda, but the path ahead remains contingent on navigating critical complexities.

Operational Context

In a period of global uncertainty marked by shifting alliances and economic fragmentation, the United Kingdom and India have emerged as steady, pragmatic partners. This strategic shift can be situated within the broader reconfiguration of Britain’s global strategy grounded in “pragmatic internationalism,” which aims to restore Britain’s credibility as a responsible global actor while adapting to a world increasingly shaped by Indo-Pacific geopolitics.

1. Recalibrating Britain’s global posture:

The withdrawal from the European Union not only removed Britain from the core of continental governance structures but also disrupted established frameworks of trade, diplomacy and security. In this post Brexit era, Prime Minister Keir Starmer inherited a foreign policy landscape marked by the dual imperatives of reasserting Britain’s international relevance and navigating domestic economic recovery. These tasks are further complicated by the unpredictability of the global order, exemplified by the disruptive legacy of Trump’s policies, and the simultaneous intensification of great power competition across both the Indo-Pacific and Europe. The Starmer administration response has been a transition from the “Global Britain” narrative characterised by the conservative era toward a more pragmatic and sustainable engagement model.

The Indo-Pacific stands at the heart of this transformation as it accounts for more than 60 percent of global GDP and international trade flows, and it encompasses critical maritime choke points, emergent high-tech markets, and rapidly growing economies. This engagement with the Indo-Pacific offers dual advantages to Britain: access to expanding consumer and industrial markets and an opportunity to participate actively in shaping a rules-based regional order that is increasingly characterised by complexity and competition. Within this landscape, India assumes an indispensable role as the anchor and reliable partner of Britain’s Indo-Pacific strategy due to its combination of democratic governance, technological capability, and strategic autonomy. Apart from the economic leverage, India functions as a stabilising counterweight within a region increasingly shaped by the assertive policies of China.

2.The Indo Pacific Pivot:

The concept of a British “Indo-Pacific Tilt” was first articulated under the Conservative governments of Boris Johnson and Rishi Sunak, capturing London’s intent to reassert its influence east of Suez and renew commitments to regional security and economic engagement. The tilt reflected the traditional UK approach of leveraging its historical naval reach and Commonwealth connections to signal relevance in a strategically vital region, but it struggled to move beyond traditional power projection to embed the UK into broader economic and technological architectures.

In contrast, Starmer’s approach represents a qualitative shift from episodic engagement to a sustained, multidimensional strategic pivot. Under his administration, the Indo-Pacific is no longer treated as a venue for ad hoc diplomacy or symbolic signalling but rather the central axis of Britain’s post-Brexit global strategy, encompassing economic, security, technological, and societal dimensions. This evolution is premised in the recognition that twenty-first-century influence relies not on the rhetoric of historical prestige, but on the ability to forge resilient, mutually beneficial institutionalised cooperation that generates concrete outcomes for both domestic and foreign policy objectives.

3.India’s central role in Britain’s Indo-Pacific engagement:

For Britain’s Indo-Pacific strategy, India’s centrality is tangible, multidimensional, and deeply embedded in operational, economic, and strategic agendas rather than mere diplomatic symbolism. As London seeks to institutionalise its presence in the region, India provides the foundation for sustained bilateral engagement across defence, technology, trade, and climate innovation through its geographic significance, economic vitality, and political stability. India’s steady evolution offers Britain a reliable and versatile partner that enables the UK to anchor its Indo-Pacific ambitions with substance and continuity, spanning high-value sectors from trade, defence and technology.

The economic relationship serves as the most immediate vector of strategic alignment as bilateral trade between India and the UK reached approximately USD 56 billion in 2024 and is projected to grow significantly under the recent agreements. The July 2025 visit of PM Modi to the UK culminated in laying down institutional blueprints for collaboration in aerospace, cyber, and maritime security through the signing of the landmark India-UK Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) and endorsement of the broader Vision 2035 framework.

These instruments institutionalise preferential market access, augmented regulatory cooperation, and tariff elimination on 99 percent of Indian exports to the UK including key sectors such as textiles, pharmaceuticals, machinery, and automotive components.

For Britain, India is an indispensable economic hedge as these concessions are projected to raise bilateral trade beyond £40 billion annually by 2030, generating tens of thousands of jobs in both economies. Post-Brexit, these agreements position London to seek high-growth markets and diversified trade partners in India while the UK offers technological know-how and access to advanced value-chains in sectors such as clean energy, fintech, and professional services.

Beyond trade, the region’s maritime routes, shipping chokepoints and developing defence architectures place India at the centre of Britain’s strategic calculus. During the recent visit, the two leaders discussed closer cooperation in defence industrialisation, maritime security, counterterrorism, and extradition frameworks. The launch of the India-UK Defence Industrial Roadmap under Vision 2035 marks a major shift to joint development of advanced technologies, including jet engines, naval systems, and AI platforms. Additionally, the launch of the joint India-UK Net Zero Innovation Virtual Centre, the establishment of a Connectivity & Innovation Centre focusing on 6G and non-terrestrial networks, and the creation of a Critical Minerals Supply Chain Observatory reflect the ambition of expanding bilateral ties in AI, critical minerals, clean energy and fintech.

4. The Macro strategic environment:

The Indo-Pacific today represents the world’s central theatre of strategic transformation where military, economic, and technological rivalries are reshaping global order. This fluid space accounts for 60 percent of global GDP, 65 percent of world trade, and over half the global population, making it significantly relevant in the broader Indo-Pacific environment within which the UK-India partnership operates. This geopolitical environment is defined by intensifying great-power competition and structural economic interdependence, a condition where major powers are economically intertwined but strategically adversarial. The United States remains the principal shaper of the regional order with predominant military power, yet its relative influence is being tested by China’s regional assertiveness and the growing agency of middle powers such as India, Japan, Australia, Indonesia, and South Korea.

For Britain, this evolving environment necessitates strategic adaptation through embedded partnerships with a network of like-minded partners capable of maintaining a rules-based order. To add up, due to lack of unilateral power projection, the UK derives its Indo-Pacific relevance from acting as a networked connector by linking European, transatlantic, and Asian democracies across economic, security, and technological domains. The partnership with India embodies this shift: by aligning with a rising regional power that shares its commitment to openness and pragmatic multipolarity, Britain anchors its post-Brexit identity in strategic relevance rather than historical nostalgia.

Geopolitical Tensions:

The deepening India-UK partnership operates within a region characterised by overlapping power rivalries, normative contestation, and strategic ambiguity. As both nations operate within the shadow of intensifying geopolitical competition to align ambition with capability, they must navigate this increasingly crowded geopolitical landscape with strategic caution.

1. China’s assertiveness:

The Indo-Pacific security landscape has been redefined due to China’s sustained military modernisation, maritime expansion, and economic coercion. Its assertive behaviour in the South China Sea and growing presence in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) through dual-use port facilities in Sri Lanka, Pakistan, and the Maldives have raised alarms among regional democracies. For Britain, Beijing presents a complex challenge as it is simultaneously a key trading partner, a systemic competitor, and a strategic rival. Post-Brexit, London’s reliance on Chinese markets particularly in high-tech manufacturing, green transition supply chains, and investment flows creates a dilemma between economic pragmatism and security alignment with Washington.

Hence, London’s Indo-Pacific approach under Keir Starmer favours partnership-based deterrence over a traditional military footprint by leveraging collaboration with India, Japan, and Australia to uphold maritime security and support freedom of navigation. However, having a history of border conflicts with China and still facing ongoing Line of Actual Control (LAC) tensions, New Delhi faces a similar but sharper dilemma and perceives Chinese assertiveness as a direct security threat. As a result, India favors measured deterrence and competitive coexistence rather than open confrontation, choosing resilience and balance in its approach.

The tension lies in calibrating this balance as Britain’s participation in AUKUS and its alignment with the US led Indo-Pacific architecture risk being perceived in Beijing as part of a Western encirclement strategy. Its response remains rooted in strategic autonomy as it resists the perception of bloc politics and carries a balancing act that allows its engagement with the UK, while maintaining space to engage China economically and diplomatically where necessary.

2. The US factor and Trump’s disruptive policies:

While the United States continues to remain the anchor of the Western strategic architecture in the Indo-Pacific, renewed uncertainty under the Trump administration clouds the stability of transatlantic and regional diplomatic efforts. Amid escalating competition with China, Washington’s expectations of greater defense commitments and active collaboration to strengthen collective security from its partners in AUKUS and the wider transatlantic alliance has rapidly surged. This has prompted both London and New Delhi to adopt greater strategic independence in the Indo-Pacific while delicately balancing alignment with US priorities.

In this context, the UK-India partnership offers both an opportunity and capacity to shape regional outcomes without subordinating their interests to great-power agendas. The joint initiatives in the Commonwealth, G20, and climate diplomacy offer adaptable platforms for India and Britain to coordinate on global challenges but also expose both countries to competing US demands on burden-sharing, sanctions adherence, and defense industry cooperation.

3. The European dimension:

A further dimension of geopolitical complexity emerges from Europe’s evolving engagement with the Indo-Pacific, which is characterised by both strategic convergence and institutional fragmentation. In the aftermath of Brexit, the United Kingdom finds itself simultaneously aligned with and detached from continental European approaches to the region, necessitating a delicate balance between coordination and competition.

For example, France and Germany have each articulated Indo-Pacific strategies centred on economic diversification, maritime presence, and democratic coordination while the UK has leveraged its historical naval networks and Commonwealth linkages to maintain a distinctive profile. All the nations have a shared recognition of the region’s geopolitical centrality but differ sharply in emphasis, scale, and strategic intent. The UK’s pragmatic diplomacy aligns closely with India’s vision of inclusive regionalism, supporting ASEAN centrality, sustainable connectivity, and development-oriented cooperation.

4. Regional sensitivity and the ASEAN equation:

The UK’s renewed engagement in Indo-Pacific affairs, illustrated through its participation in security frameworks like AUKUS and the deployment of its Carrier Strike Group, has revived old regional sensitivities about external power intervention. While ASEAN member states generally welcome the involvement of extra-regional actors that contribute to maintaining strategic balance and maritime stability, they remain cautious of developments that may accelerate the militarisation of regional waters or erode ASEAN-led mechanisms. India, meanwhile, has long prioritised ASEAN centrality and views the Indo-Pacific through an inclusive lens that privileges dialogue, cooperative security, and open regionalism over overt bloc formation.

This divergence in regional signalling presents potential challenges for UK-India policy coordination. Despite Prime Minister Starmer’s efforts to reorient British foreign policy toward a more consultative and diplomatically measured posture, traces of traditional great‑power activism continue to inform the UK’s engagement style. In contrast, India’s preference for quiet balancing and developmental diplomacy may not always align with London’s visibility-driven engagement. The durability and effectiveness of the bilateral partnership will therefore hinge on the UK’s capacity to calibrate its regional narrative in line with prevailing Indo‑Pacific norms of restraint, inclusivity, and consensus‑building.

Strategic Outlook:

1. From symbolism to strategic institutionalism:

The evolving UK-India relationship now stands at the threshold of consolidation with the major frameworks of cooperation already institutionalised through CETA and Vision 2035. The next decade will test the capacity of both governments to translate these blueprints into sustained, measurable outcomes as this demands a long-term strategy of institutional embedding, political consistency, and strategic adaptability in a region marked by volatility and flux.

The recent creation of a Joint Strategic Implementation Council under Vision 2035 designed to monitor progress across innovation, defence co-development, and regulatory convergence reflects that both nations are increasingly aware that the success of their Indo-Pacific engagement depends on predictability and trust. Over the coming decade, this bureaucratic deepening supported by annual ministerial reviews and parliamentary oversight could turn the partnership into a durable pillar of Britain’s post-Brexit foreign policy architecture, providing continuity irrespective of leadership changes in London or New Delhi.

2. Economic and Technological synergies:

The next phase of bilateral cooperation goes beyond geopolitics as it is likely to be shaped by technology industrialisation and innovation ecosystems rather than conventional trade flows. The CETA’s tariff eliminations have already spurred new collaboration in pharmaceuticals, semiconductors, clean energy, defence manufacturing, and AI regulation. The comparative advantage of Britain in research infrastructure, capital markets, and regulatory governance complements India’s scale, market potential, and engineering capacity. The joint launch of the Critical Minerals Observatory and the Connectivity and Innovation Centre provide the foundation for a technology alliance that can insulate both economies from overdependence on China-centric supply chains and enable them to co-create standards for 6G technologies, digital public infrastructure, and net-zero manufacturing.

3. Balancing strategic constraints:

As the Indo-Pacific remains defined by competitive multipolarity, structural limitations persist, despite momentum. Both countries face the challenge of balancing alignment with autonomy as the success of this strategic partnership hinges on maintaining strategic patience and policy pragmatism. The UK faces resource constraints and must balance its Indo-Pacific commitments with European security obligations amid an unsettled Euro-Atlantic environment. Meanwhile, India’s cautious approach toward binding security alignments and its emphasis on strategic autonomy will temper the extent of defence integration.

Implication for the regional global order

The deepening alignment between India and the United Kingdom represents a recalibration of the middle power agency in sustaining an increasingly fragmented global order. It reflects a deeper structural shift in the international order that is marked by diffusion of power, decline of hegemonic stability, and reconfiguration of partnerships around shared functionality that will define the contours of global order in the next decade. For India, this partnership reinforces its ambition to act as both a regional balancer and a bridge between the Global North and South. For Britain, it serves as the foundation of its post-Brexit global identity enabling it to project influence beyond Europe through selective engagement, defence collaboration, and regulatory leadership.

As the world’s primary geopolitical arena, both states recognise that the Indo-Pacific cannot be governed by a single hegemon, instead stability will depend on a loosely institutionalised order where multiple actors like Japan, Australia, ASEAN, France, the EU, and now the UK will share burdens and shape norms. Regionally, this partnership contributes to shaping a stable but flexible Indo-Pacific architecture as the UK-India axis also reinforces the logic of transregional governance where influence is distributed through functional coalitions rather than rigid alliances. London’s participation in groupings such as AUKUS, the G7+ outreach to the Indo-Pacific, and the Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative complements India’s leadership within the Quad, I2U2, and the Global South dialogue frameworks. As a result, both nations do not command unilateral dominance which helps in crafting a model of cooperative multipolarity to sustain a pluralistic order anchored in connectivity, maritime security, and resilient supply chains.

At the global level, this collaboration underscores a gradual redistribution of agency within international politics where middle powers are no longer reactive players but active architects of governance. It signifies a movement toward a “networked multilateralism” across issue-based coalitions that could redefine how democracies engage with the Global South.

In essence, the deepening of UK-India ties embodies a new phase in the global world order, one where adaptability, shared innovation, and credible partnerships become the currency of power in a post-hegemonic world.

Manisha Shrivastava is a Global Policy Intelligence Fellow at the Sixteenth Council