Africa’s Strategic Position in the Red Sea and Indian Ocean Geopolitics: What’s really at stake as African coastal countries attract the world’s biggest powers?

Africa’s Waters Are Not Just Trade Routes, They Are Strategic Power Zones in a New Global Order

To the casual observer, Africa’s coast might appear peripheral, long stretches of ocean-facing land that support fishing communities and modest ports. But in strategic and economic terms, these waters are some of the most important in the world. The Red Sea, which runs between northeast Africa and the Arabian Peninsula, connects directly to the Suez Canal a man-made artery that channels about 10% of global trade, including energy supplies, food, and manufactured goods, between Europe and Asia. The western Indian Ocean, running along the eastern coast of Africa, links these flows to the economic powerhouses of China, India, and Southeast Asia.

This isn’t just geography, it’s leverage. And global powers know it.

As maritime competition intensifies, Africa is no longer a passive route for ships to pass through. Instead, countries like Djibouti, Somalia, Kenya, and Tanzania are becoming the terrain where new alliances are being forged and rivalries are playing out. Whoever has a foothold in these strategic ports can influence global trade routes, military logistics, and the political architecture of the wider Indo-Pacific and Gulf regions.

The stakes are enormous. These are not simply waters to be patrolled. They are frontlines where power is projected, influence is established, and futures are negotiated.

Why Global Powers Are Scrambling for Access to African Ports and Bases

Foreign interest in African ports and military bases has surged dramatically in the past decade, driven not by admiration for African economic potential, but by calculated geopolitical strategy. From Djibouti to Dar es Salaam, global powers are vying for control or influence over key maritime real estate along Africa’s vast and strategically located coastline. The continent borders crucial global waterways like the Red Sea, the Atlantic Ocean, and the Indian Ocean, making it a natural hub for overseeing maritime trade routes and projecting military power. At the heart of this scramble lies a simple logic: in today’s world, ports are no longer just economic assets they are strategic platforms, offering both commercial utility and military leverage.

Djibouti illustrates this reality with striking clarity. Despite its small size and population of under one million, it now hosts five foreign military bases including those of direct rivals such as the United States and China, located just a few kilometres apart. There is nowhere else in the world where these two powers coexist so closely in a permanent military capacity. The reason is geographical: Djibouti overlooks the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, a critical chokepoint connecting the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden and, by extension, the Suez Canal. Control or even visibility over this passage offers extraordinary strategic advantage, particularly in times of crisis or conflict.

This pattern is repeated further down the coast. In Somaliland, the Berbera port is being expanded under a UAE-backed deal, while Kenya’s Lamu port part of the LAPSSET Corridor is rising with foreign support. Though often framed as trade and infrastructure projects, these ports are increasingly designed as dual-use facilities: commercial during peacetime, but capable of hosting military assets when needed. This duality reflects the reality that global powers are not just building infrastructure they are buying influence and access under long-term leases and discreet security agreements.

Why the sudden rush? Several dynamics converge here. First, the global strategic environment has shifted. As the rivalry between the US and China deepens, both sides are aggressively seeking footholds beyond their traditional spheres of influence. For China, its Belt and Road Initiative includes not just railways and ports, but the overseas military capacity to secure its supply chains. Its naval base in Djibouti, its first abroad, is part of that logic. For the US, maintaining superiority and access along global sea lanes requires a permanent presence in strategic theatres, especially near the Middle East and East Africa.

But it’s not just Washington and Beijing. Former colonial powers like France are re-entrenching themselves in West and Central Africa. Turkey is expanding its influence along the Horn through both religious soft power and hard assets like naval support facilities. Gulf states like the UAE and Saudi Arabia are pouring billions into Red Sea ports from Eritrea to Sudan to secure maritime trade routes and counter Iranian influence in the region. The Horn of Africa, in particular, has become a maritime extension of Gulf regional security strategies.

The interest is also driven by the fact that Africa remains politically fragmented but physically pivotal. Many African governments welcome foreign investment in infrastructure, especially when they lack the capital or expertise to build these assets themselves. In return, foreign powers gain long-term access, strategic depth, and diplomatic leverage. The continent’s maritime domain, still relatively under-militarised, offers low-resistance opportunities for foreign powers to expand their naval reach.

Yet, this surge of foreign involvement is a double-edged sword for Africa. On the one hand, it brings much-needed investment, infrastructure upgrades, job creation, and trade facilitation. On the other hand, it raises serious concerns about sovereignty erosion, militarisation of civilian infrastructure, and the risk of Africa becoming a proxy theatre for global competition. Leasing a port for 30 or 50 years effectively hands over a slice of national territory to an external power, often with little public scrutiny. Moreover, when civilian trade zones become entangled with military ambitions, they are exposed to geopolitical risk as tensions among foreign powers can easily spill over into African territories.

What we are witnessing is not merely an infrastructure race it is a new phase in the global contest for influence. Control of ports means control of information, supply lines, surveillance, and regional access. In an era of great power competition, Africa’s coastlines are no longer peripheral. They are central to how the world’s powers secure their interests, and Africa is fast becoming the frontline of that struggle. The real question now is whether African states can negotiate this interest from a position of strength balancing development needs with strategic sovereignty or whether they will once again become passive landscapes in other people’s games.

African Governments Are No Longer Spectators, They Are Strategic Negotiators, But the Outcomes Are Uneven

Unlike in past eras when foreign powers-imposed terms with impunity, today’s African leaders have far more agency in determining who gets access to their coastlines and on what terms. Many countries are learning to play their cards strategically, offering port rights, basing access, or investment deals in exchange for infrastructure, debt relief, or military support.

Djibouti, for instance, has managed to position itself as a neutral host to multiple powers without being overtly pulled into their rivalries turning its geography into sustained diplomatic leverage and revenue. Somalia, despite its domestic instability, has signed a 10-year maritime security agreement with Turkey, including exclusive economic rights to parts of its waters and port development arrangements. Kenya, too, has entered into various port partnerships with China, Japan, and European investors, seeking to build itself as an Indian Ocean logistics hub for the region.

However, not all African governments have handled this engagement with equal strategic clarity. In some cases, deals have been signed in secret, with limited parliamentary oversight or civil input. Others have entered into agreements that offer little local benefit, handing over long-term control of strategic infrastructure in exchange for short-term gains.

The challenge is not whether Africa can attract global interest it clearly can. The real question is whether African states can coordinate their leverage to ensure that foreign partnerships serve African priorities, not just external agendas.

While much attention is paid to trade and investment, it’s the security dimension that is rapidly transforming Africa’s maritime zones. Piracy in the Gulf of Aden may have receded since its peak a decade ago, but other threats have emerged, arms trafficking, drug smuggling, illegal fishing, and the use of maritime routes by extremist networks. These risks are now being used as justifications for increased foreign military presence.

Foreign navies patrol these waters not just to secure shipping lanes, but to safeguard national interests, influence regional conflict zones, and pre-position military assets close to flashpoints in the Middle East, the Horn of Africa, and the western Indo-Pacific.

At the same time, new security agreements between African states and foreign powers often include clauses that permit base construction, intelligence sharing, or exclusive access to certain maritime zones. This raises critical questions: Are these deals improving African security in the long term? Or are they creating dependencies that limit national control?

To date, regional coordination remains weak. The African Union’s Integrated Maritime Strategy (2050 AIM Strategy) exists on paper but has made limited impact in practice. The Djibouti Code of Conduct aimed at enhancing cooperation on piracy and maritime crime has had some success, but struggles with funding, capacity, and uneven implementation across member states.

The result is a fragmented security environment, where powerful outsiders shape the rules while African coastal states navigate overlapping interests with limited bargaining power.

Can Africa Use Maritime Infrastructure to Build Sovereignty Rather Than Trade It Away?

One of the greatest contradictions in this story is the tension between economic ambition and strategic vulnerability. African governments need ports to boost exports, attract logistics investment, and connect landlocked regions to global markets. But many of these same ports are being built or financed by actors with geostrategic motives leading to deals that mix commerce with military access.

Take the example of Berbera, where the UAE-backed DP World is developing a port with potential for both trade and naval use. Or Lamu, where Kenya’s plans for an East African logistics corridor sit alongside rising regional security concerns. The dual-use nature of these projects makes it difficult to separate economic goals from foreign political agendas.

When these deals are not carefully negotiated and monitored, African sovereignty is undermined in subtle but lasting ways. Port operations may be outsourced. Revenue-sharing may be opaque. Security clauses may allow foreign vessels rites of passage or control over strategic waters.

This doesn’t mean Africa should reject foreign partnerships. But it does mean the terms of engagement must change. Infrastructure must be used to build power, not just attract it. Ownership models, legal frameworks, and multilateral coordination all need to catch up to the speed of global interest.

What Africa Must Do to Lead in Its Own Waters

Africa is now a central player in the geopolitics of the seas, but that power remains underleveraged. The continent’s response must move beyond reactive posturing to proactive strategy. This begins with clarity: What do African states want from their maritime future? What are the non-negotiables? How will they coordinate foreign partnerships to maximise collective influence?

Three priorities should guide Africa’s next steps:

            1.         Develop a unified maritime policy framework that sets standards for port development, military basing, and foreign access. This will prevent a patchwork of deals that serve external interests more than regional goals.

            2.         Invest in African naval capacity and regional coordination mechanisms. Without credible enforcement capability and maritime governance, policy will remain aspirational.

            3.         Negotiate from strength not desperation. Africa’s geography is already a strategic asset. The key is to demand investment terms that include technology transfer, local jobs, environmental safeguards, and infrastructure control.

The Red Sea and Indian Ocean may not dominate headlines in Africa today, but they will shape the continent’s future in ways that few inland decisions can match. Whoever controls these waters doesn’t just influence trade. They influence politics, diplomacy, and destiny.

Maryjane Eze is a research fellow at the African Program of the Sixteenth Council