Europe on the Brink: The Need to Secure Strategic Autonomy Amid Trumpian Geopolitics

Analysts worldwide warned of greater uncertainty upon the re-election of President Trump in January and we are now seeing the preliminary effects of a renewed ‘Trump Doctrine’, marked by an increasingly self-centric foreign policy. While the United States was expected to delink from world politics in favor of more inward-looking policies, the reality has been more complex. From President Trump’s ambitious plans for Gaza to his unilateral initiation of dialogue with Russia’s Putin over Ukraine, America’s allies, particularly in Europe, seem to be excluded from conversations central to their interests. The amplified volatility has made something that was noticeable obvious: the need for Europe to embolden its voice on the world stage and back its words with true capability. 

A few months ago, I highlighted the EU’s pressing economic challenges, including slow growth and lack of investment, in an article titled Europe’s Economic Predicament: How to Stop the Decline? Today, Europe’s challenges are no longer limited to the economic sphere. As was evidenced by Vice-President Vance’s speech at the Munich Security Conference this year, it faces very real security concerns and vulnerabilities precipitated by an over-reliance on the United States for defense. This has led to a moral hazard, where due to being dependent on American security guarantees and the expectation that Washington will uphold its defense promises, European military infrastructure is significantly underfunded and incapable. The Trump administration’s distancing from European interests has exacerbated pressures on Brussels which has been gripped by an uninspiring ‘doom and gloom’ mindset. This is emblematic of a broader pattern where the United States’ self-centric foreign policy is compelling foreign actors to recognize the amplified realpolitik and reorient themselves toward greater self-sufficiency. Therefore, the current geopolitical volatility must be perceived as the opportunity that it is: a chance for Europe to reimagine its security infrastructure and trade policies to regain strategic autonomy and defend its interests independently. 

Europe’s challenges are no longer limited to the economic sphere. As was evidenced by Vice-President Vance’s speech at the Munich Security Conference this year, it faces very real security concerns and vulnerabilities precipitated by an over-reliance on the United States for defense. This has led to a moral hazard, where due to being dependent on American security guarantees

Europe’s Deepening Political-Economic Challenges

While the security risks posed by Russia are obvious, Europe faces significant implicit challenges. First, as Kier Giles (2025) in his article for the Financial Times underscores, the United States’ policy focus is shifting away from Europe. He highlights that Europe had ceased to be a priority for American policymakers even before the inauguration of the second Trump Administration. Second is the widening gap between EU countries themselves, making it difficult for Brussels to form a united front and engineer coherent policies. Third is the loss of Europe’s bargaining power, precipitated by slow growth and reduced investment. At this stage, there simply isn’t much Europe can offer to the United States or any other country, making it unlikely for anyone to accommodate its interests.

The Rift Between Brussels and Washington

The Trump administration’s foreign policy has predictably revolved around raising trade barriers and advancing an ‘America First’ narrative in world politics. Further, there has been very little emphasis on pursuing multilateral solutions to the various geopolitical crises plaguing the world today. Instead, President Trump has favored unilateral or bilateral approaches to his foreign relations, including his stance on Ukraine. In his first overseas trip as Secretary of Defense, Peter Hegseth, wearing the American flag as his pocket square, proclaimed that the United States was no longer primarily focused on European security (The Guardian, 2025). Moreover, this shift is not completely attributable to the Trump administration. The Biden administration’s decision to supply Israel with the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile system and forces to operate it contrasts significantly with no troop deployments to Ukraine. Moreover, American assets deployed to the Middle East directly engaged Iranian missiles and drones in October 2024 to defend Israel while the United States has made no such interventions in Ukraine despite Kiev’s multiple requests. 

Hence, from an offensive realist perspective championed by theorists such as John Mearsheimer, it is clear that Europe can no longer rely on American security guarantees in the long term. Washington has pressured its NATO allies to meet their defense spending obligations amounting to 2% of their respective GDPs, a requirement fulfilled by 23 out of its 32 members (Falkanek, 2023). However, little investment is earmarked for developing a European defense infrastructure, with major countries such as the United Kingdom operating with militaries that are “unprepared to fight and win a conflict at any scale”, according to the International Institute for Strategic Studies (2025). These concerns become pronounced when considering Europe’s central role in maintaining the post-war order in Ukraine as the United States prepares to transition to a passive role upon the completion of its negotiations with Russia.  

Perception and Misperception Regarding Security in Europe

Threat perceptions regarding Russia’s aggression in Ukraine vary between countries. While eastern European states are significantly alarmed by the possibility of the conflict spilling eastwards, central and western European nations continue to view it as a distant war having relatively insignificant effects on their territorial integrity. Walsh et al. (2024) prove a strong correlation between geographic proximity to conflict and military spending by applying the ‘fear hypothesis’, suggesting that nations increase defense expenditure in response to growing exogenous security threats. This results in different levels of preparedness and policy responses, putting the EU and NATO on an incoherent footing. For instance, Poland has spearheaded deterrence and military buildup by spending 4.7% of its GDP on defense in 2025, citing security threats presented by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine (Reuters, 2024). On the contrary, larger EU economies such as Italy continue to fall short of NATO’s 2% defense spending target by having a military budget amounting to a mere 1.6% of its GDP. Given this discrepancy, Ukrainian President Zelensky’s calls for the creation of a ‘European Army’ seem far from feasible. Instead, a rearmament drive, akin to the interwar years, would boost the preparedness of European countries and serve as a deterrent to Moscow’s emboldened belligerency. However, European industry is a shadow of its former self, making an arms buildup similar to that of the 1930s farfetched. Thus, Europe finds itself in an awkward position where mutual defense informed by liberal internationalism is unrealistic, and military deterrence informed by realism unaffordable.  

Europe’s Economic Predicament Persists

Europe’s economic outlook has seen little change since I authored my article on the issue in November 2024. If anything, its position has become even more precarious due to rising trade tensions between Brussels and Washington. President Trump hinted at the possibility of applying tariffs to EU imports to the US, further shrinking the profit margins of European producers already grappling with inflation and high interest rates. Further, it is not only the United States the bloc finds itself in trade tensions with. Brussels went head to head with Beijing in a tense tariff exchange as the EU tariffed Chinese electric vehicles and the latter responded with tariffs on European brandy. Ultimately, responding to American tariffs with tariffs of its own will do little good to the EU. Instead, it could source more defense equipment from the United States to kill two birds with one stone as it would appease President Trump while also increasing its defense spending. However, this would reduce the market share of European defense manufacturers, making it an unwise decision in the long term. Hence, it must cut red tape and boost intra-bloc trade which has been declining since 2022. For instance, exports from EU countries to other EU countries amounted to €374 billion in August 2022 but declined to €337 in December 2023 (Eurostat, 2023). Moreover, creating a coherent single capital market, aligning with the recommendations of the much anticipated Draghi Report, would create a larger resource pool for European businesses, streamlining access to finance. Thus, Europe must adapt to today’s volatile trade climate, realizing that the EU’s most trusted trade partner is the EU itself. 

Conclusion

As the U.S. adopts a more self-centered foreign policy under President Trump, Europe must recognize the vulnerabilities of its over-reliance on American security guarantees and take decisive action to strengthen its security capabilities and economic cohesion. With defense spending inconsistencies, economic fragmentation, and risks posed by the war in Ukraine, Europe faces a pressing need to regain its strategic autonomy. In an increasingly volatile world, Europe’s future depends on its ability to defend itself and lead independently, no longer reliant on American security guarantees. As UN Secretary-General António Guterres said, “Moments of great difficulty are also moments of great opportunity”. Investments in the right technologies and manufacturing, cohesive policymaking, and business-friendly legislation can alleviate the many challenges facing Brussels in an era of Trumpian geopolitics. Ultimately, Europe must exit its comfort zone and break its self-imposed shackles, adopting a more dynamic, inspiring, and confident stance in the global political economy.

Ishan Jasuja  is a research fellow at the Sixteenth Council