Asia’s Geopolitical Landscape: Navigating Rising Tensions
Asia’s geopolitical landscape has changed drastically in the 21st century, particularly so in recent years as new power players – India, China, and Russia – have emerged. Currently, many nations in the continent face internal struggles – South Korea’s recent martial law and presidential impeachment trials (Hioe, 2024), Myanmar’s military dictatorship (CFR, 2023), and many more. Smaller states are increasingly being forced to choose sides in power struggles for regional hegemony. Now, Asia is shifting away from the dominant Western-led globalisation economic era, to one that is focused on economic relations based on policy imposition and national alliances.
Current Geopolitical Landscape
Currently, Asia is dominated by the competition between the United States and China, which has had widespread regional consequences (Schöttli, 2023). China’s rise as a global superpower has led to backlash from the United States. This rivalry is largely driven by differing state models; the United States has a democratic regime while China is ruled by a communist, authoritarian ruling party, the Chinese Communist Party (ibid). Trade wars between China and the U.S. stem from these ideological differences, and U.S. fear of the spread of communism. Smaller states must increasingly choose between the United States and China, at risk of economic losses. For example, as a recipient of U.S. sanctions for human rights abuses, Cambodia has become reliant on China, as a trade partner and an aid donor (Liu & Clark, 2024). Cambodia has thus strengthened its ties with China in recent years, supporting China’s spread of influence across Asia and its reunification with Taiwan.
Asian countries belong to a variety of different regional security partnerships, rather than one joint agreement in the present day. These are dominated by the interests of powerful countries, within and outside of Asia. The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), formed in 1989, has 21 member states, and is focused on creating a positive business environment for its members, through trade and investment liberalisation (Schöttli, 2023). Not included in APEC are Russia, China, and the United States. Rivaling APEC is the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), a 2012 Chinese initiative (ibid). RCEP is a free trade agreement between its member states, and largely includes countries with economies that are dependent on China (ibid). Other smaller scale trade partnerships exist as well.
China and India
Two new global powers, China and India, have been facing increasing tensions, greatly affecting South Asia. India and China’s fraught national relations are largely based on their border dispute over the “Line of Actual Control” (LAC) boundary, coupled with their battle for regional hegemony (Laxmi Narayan et al., 2023). In 2020, a military clash between the two nations ensued after India constructed a road to an air base in the disputed region (ibid). A recent deal has been made between the two states to avoid further deadly clashes in the zone, marking a potential path forward in the Line of Actual Control (Marsi, 2024).
In the midst of the border battles and negotiations, both countries have been expanding their respective presences across the Asian continent through alliances with other countries. India has developed stronger relations with the United States in recent years to curb Chinese power (Pulami, 2022). India has also turned to Australia, Japan, Indonesia, Vietnam, France, and the United Kingdom as allies (Laxmi Narayan et al., 2023). Seeking neighboring allies, India has deployed a “neighbourhood first policy,” in which it has established dominance over small South Asian states, forcing these to choose sides in the India-China rivalry (Pulami, 2022).
In light of the post-Cold War India-Pakistan conflict, China has been able to form a mutually beneficial relationship with Pakistan, in opposition to India. In 2015, the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) was created under the Chinese Belt-and-Road (BRI) initiative, running through disputed areas of Jammu and Kashmir (Laxmi Narayan et al., 2023; Pulami, 2022). While India refused to recognise the new Taliban government in Afghanistan, China hosted the new regime in 2021, offering 31 million USD in emergency aid (Pulami, 2022).
Currently, China and India’s relationship with one another is paradoxical, as both countries rely on the other for trade, yet simultaneously they seek to overpower the other in regional dominance (Laxmi Narayan et al., 2023). These relations are seen in dynamics in which each country attempts to counter moves made by the other: As China’s BRI initiative has expanded throughout South Asia, India has launched its Project MAUSAM (Pulami, 2022). As India stopped COVID-19 vaccine exports, China expanded vaccination exports to Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh (ibid).
In recent years, India’s power in South Asia has decreased, ceded to China. Previously, small states (i.e. Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, etc.) were heavily reliant on India, but now China offers them alternative trade and investment options (Pulami, 2022). Now, these states are trapped in the battle between these two nations, and their trade relations have increasingly political implications. Though mainly manifesting in the form of trade wars, the contest between China and India has the potential for deadly consequences; both countries have access to nuclear weapons (ibid). There may, however, also be the potential for a strengthened relationship between the two nations, as
China and Taiwan
A large issue, with power to affect the entire East Asia region is the China-Taiwan conflict. This dispute stems from the 1949 Chinese civil war, in which Chiang and his supporters fled to Chinese territory Taiwan after defeat by Mao Zedong’s communist army (BBC, 2024). Since then, mainland China has been governed by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), while Taiwan has been ruled by the Democratic Progressive Party (DDP). The tension emerges from two distinct views on Taiwan’s independence: China considers Taiwan a “breakaway province” of China while Taiwan views itself as an independent nation (BBC, 2024). Currently, Taiwan is neither fully independent nor fully integrated into the Chinese state.
Since 1987, relations between the two have improved as they have collaborated economically, however they remain strained (Bukhari et al., 2024). Taiwan is a key island, partially due to its geographic location, and partially because of its industries; located between East and Southeast Asia, Taiwan currently blocks Chinese control of the region (ibid). Taiwan also plays a large role in producing semiconductors and electronic components necessary for technological devices, thus possessing a large economy and role in global value chains (Bukhari et al., 2024). Currently, Taiwan holds 92% of manufacturing for advanced chips, and its semiconductor industry continues to grow in profitability, valued at $162.5 billion in 2022 (Jones & Krulikowski, 2024). Its location and economic strength have afforded Taiwan military support from countries such as the United States, South Korea, and Japan (Bukhari et al., 2024).
Currently, Taiwan is widely referred to as the “Republic of China,” not viewed as sovereign by the grand majority of countries globally (Bukhari et al., 2024). A 2004 Chinese law states that China may use non-peaceful tactics on Taiwan, should the island attempt to secede, thus halting Taiwan from seeking full sovereignty (BBC, 2024). Yet simultaneously, Taiwan’s international military supporters – such as the U.S and its allies (e.g. South Korea, Australia, Philippines) – prevent a full-scale takeover of Taiwan by China (Johnstone, 2024).. This dynamic may be set to change in the future, having widespread effects on the economies and security of East Asian states. Chinese President Xi Jinping has announced a 2049 goal of “achieving the Chinese dream,” which involves reunification with Taiwan (BBC, 2024). In December, China undertook military drills around Taiwan, theorised to be a reaction to Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te’s trips overseas to various Pacific countries and United States territories (Hioe, 2024). Currently at a standstill, the China-Taiwan conflict has the potential to escalate, having devastating regional consequences.
Russia
Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine spurred global criticisms, largely isolating Russia from Western support (Howell, 2024). The nation has maintained positive relations with Belarus and some Central Asian countries, expanding economic activities in these to curb the impacts of U.S. economic sanctions (Rangsimaporn, 2023). As one of Russia’s largest allies, Belarus allowed for the storing of Russian nuclear weapons on its soil in 2023 (Chiu, 2023). Russia and North Korea have historically had a positive relationship, yet this relationship had not extended to military assistance until October 2024, when North Korea sent troops to assist Russia in its war against Ukraine (Howell, 2024). Furthermore, China, Russia, and North Korea have formed a tripartite alliance, with goals of blocking United States hegemony (Prince Michael of Liechtenstein, 2024). As a major arms dealer, Russia has helped curtail the effects of U.N. sanctions on Iran in its trade with the country (Martynyuk, 2024). Recently, Russia also seems to be reconsidering its stance on the Taliban as a terrorist organisation, identifying Afghanistan as a suitable location for expansion of its energy export sector (ibid). The evolving relationship between the nations has the potential to drive future regional conflict, as the nations strengthen one another’s military capabilities.
Conclusions
The current geopolitical situation in Asia can largely be described as tense. Though no new full-scale conflicts have emerged, shifting state relationships have the potential to escalate current disputes, and create new ones. In looking at China, Taiwan, India, Russia, and North Korea, it is important to consider the larger role of these powers, and their influence over weaker states. Many Asian nations with weaker economies are highly dependent on powerful players, and thus susceptible to participation in conflicts and vulnerable to economic losses due to conflicts. Smaller states increasingly cannot remain neutral in confrontations between power players (i.e. between China and India), and are forced to choose sides for fear of economic backlash. Also important to note is the possession of nuclear weapons by many countries (North Korea, India, China, Russia). Though access to these on opposing sides serves as a deterrent for their deployment, the threat of nuclear war remains pertinent. On a global scale, Asia’s conflicts manifest as an ideological clash between democracy and authoritarianism, with countries such as Russia and the United States attempting to block the spread of the other’s state models.
Annette Sorensen is a Fellow at the Sixteenth Council.
