Ethiopia’s Port Deal With Somaliland Is A Diplomatic Masterstroke

In one fell swoop, Ethiopia will grant Somaliland the recognition that it’s deserved for so long, peacefully resolve its port dilemma with all that entails for preemptively averting impending domestic-regional problems stemming from its landlocked status, and prove that mutual interests can be advanced through reciprocity.

Ethiopian Prime Minister (PM) Dr. Ahmed Abiy and President of Somaliland Muse Bihe Abdi just signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) that’ll grant Ethiopia access to Somaliland’s ports, including a naval base, in exchange for formal recognition and a stake in Ethiopian Airways. The Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ press release can be read here while Somaliland’s can be read here. For background, here are answers to “Frequently Asked Questions About Ethiopia’s Quest For Its Own Red Sea Port”.

In brief, PM Abiy revived his country’s maritime policy last year in an attempt to preemptively avert the impending domestic problems associated with its landlocked status, namely limits to economic growth and the political-security consequences thereof in light of its rapidly expanding population. Up until now, Ethiopia’s access to the global economy was monopolized by Djibouti, which charges onerous port fees. These have become an even greater burden in recent years as a result of several dramatic developments.

The pandemic worsened preexisting debt problems, which were further exacerbated by the two-year-long Northern Conflict from 2020-2022. All the while, a severe drought added even more pressure on the budget, thus complicating these financial challenges. There’s also the issue of the Red Sea’s militarization threatening the maritime logistics (particularly fertilizer and fuel) upon which Ethiopia’s economic stability and all that it entails depends, which can’t be defended without a navy.

This confluence of factors alongside the country’s rapidly expanding population resulted in PM Abiy prioritizing a pragmatic solution with the aim of preemptively averting the earlier mentioned domestic problems that could easily spiral into a self-sustaining cycle of regional instability if left unaddressed. He accordingly proposed leasing a commercial-military port in exchange for stakes in Ethiopia’s national companies, but the universally recognized coastal states weren’t interested in such a deal.

The regional security dilemma, which was described here with respect to the Ethiopian-Eritrean dimension and here as regards the broader one between the hinterland-coastal states, influenced their decisionmakers’ judgement by making them perceive of this proposal as an impending threat of sorts. Pro-government supporters from the online Eritrean community also waged an information warfare campaign that continues till this day fearmongering that Ethiopia is plotting to annex neighboring states.

The first response remained within the realm of responsible policymaking no matter how regrettable many in Ethiopia considered those countries’ decisions to reject their deal to be, while the second exacerbated the regional security dilemma and led to worries about a forthcoming war. Moreover, it can’t be ruled out that this information warfare campaign was orchestrated to a degree by Eritrean intelligence, whose country believes that its interests are served by containing Ethiopia.

In any case, the point in sharing this insight is to illustrate how difficult Ethiopia’s peaceful quest for its own seaport had become by year’s end, which should in turn help the reader appreciate what a masterstroke it was for that country and Somaliland to sign their MoU on Monday. This creative solution resolves Ethiopia’s port dilemma and preemptively averts all of its associated problems that were previously described, though that’s not to say that it doesn’t come with any risks.

Somalia is furious at what it regards as meddling in its domestic affairs due to Somaliland’s hitherto universally recognized status among UN-member states as an integral part of that fractured country despite Mogadishu having lacked any tangible influence over it for more than three decades. Eritrean intelligence is also expected to ramp up its speculative information warfare campaign to fan the flames of war as part of that country’s divide-and-rule policy as well as to discredit Ethiopia as a “rogue state”.

It’ll also likely try to expand its military ties with Somalia together with Egypt, the latter of whom has been feuding with Ethiopia for years on false pretexts over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam as part of its hegemonic plot to sabotage that country’s peaceful rise as an African leader. These political-security risks were predicable, but PM Abiy seemingly calculated that they’re nevertheless manageable and worth it for the greater good that was explained, even if Somalia complains to the UN.

Becoming the first UN-member state to recognize Somaliland’s self-declared independence is no small feat, especially since Ethiopia hosts the AU headquarters and has historically been the cradle of the continent’s Pan-African and anti-imperialist movements. PM Abiy’s move will therefore have a major impact on African affairs and could also inspire others like the UAE, which has invested heavily in Somaliland’s Berbera port and has excellent relations with Ethiopia, to follow with its own recognition.

The reader should also remember that Ethiopia just joined BRICS on the same day that it signed the MoU with Somaliland, which reduces the odds that fellow permanent UNSC members Russia and China would agree to any resolution condemning it (and possibly the UAE) for recognizing Somaliland. They might not formally recognize Somaliland, especially not China due to the Taiwan Question, but that doesn’t mean that they’d support any sanctions or threat of force against Ethiopia (and possibly the UAE) for doing so.

Objectively speaking, Somaliland is much more independent than the two Donbass Republics were on the eve of their recognition by Russia as independent states, plus that breakaway Somali region controls more of its claimed territory than its Ukrainian counterparts did. Although Russian-Somali ties are flourishing, Moscow doesn’t practice a zero-sum policy so it won’t condemn its 125-year-old Ethiopian partners at Mogadishu’s request, let alone inadvertently undermine its own stance towards Donbass.

If the UAE also recognizes Somaliland as independent, then Russia wouldn’t condemn that country either, whether bilaterally or especially not at the UNSC. President Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan was President Putin’s guest of honor at last June’s St. Petersburg International Economic Forum and the UAE is now Russia’s top Arab trade partner. Russia’s close ties with Ethiopia and the UAE, as well as its leader’s with theirs, might even see those two convince him to follow their lead with time.

Whatever ends up happening, Russia will foreseeably call for a peaceful resolution to Somalia’s disputes with Somaliland, Ethiopia, and possibly soon also the UAE if it recognizes that breakaway state’s independence too, which aligns with its principled neutrality towards foreign disputes. The same goes for the potential worsening of Egypt and Eritrea’s ties with Ethiopia (and possibly soon also the UAE) in solidarity with Somalia as driven by those two’s complementary interests in containing Ethiopia.

The regional balance of military, diplomatic, and economic power is such that a larger war over Somaliland is unlikely, which PM Abiy would have also assessed prior to signing the historic MoU with President Abdi. Tensions might spike for a brief moment as Somalia rages about this move while Egypt and Eritrea try to exploit it for their own divide-and-rule ends, but it’s unlikely that Somalia will wage war against Ethiopia (and possibly also the UAE), nor will Egypt and/or Eritrea do so either.

The best-case scenario, however unlikely it may appear at the moment, is that this MoU eventually leads to Ethiopia’s other neighbors reconsidering their decision to decline PM Abiy’s pragmatic proposal for leasing a commercial-military port in exchange for stakes in Ethiopia’s national companies. That would develop even more regional connectivity corridors and in turn draw more foreign investment, thus supercharging the Horn’s rise at this crucial moment in the global systemic transition to multipolarity.

Even if those countries’ decisionmakers prefer for their people not to profit from Ethiopia’s BRICS bonanza, then that doesn’t make this MoU any less of a diplomatic masterstroke. In one fell swoop, Ethiopia will grant Somaliland the recognition that it’s deserved for so long, peacefully resolve its port dilemma with all that entails for preemptively averting impending domestic-regional problems stemming from its landlocked status, and prove that mutual interests can be advanced through reciprocity.

Dr Andrew Korybko is a regular contributor to the Sixteenth Council Insights