Current Geopolitical Rivalries and Security Concerns for the United States

The United States faces geopolitical tensions, largely with Russia and China in the present day. Years after Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, the war remains to be resolved and there are debates within the U.S. on what the new role should be for the U.S. in providing aid to Ukraine. President Trump has indicated a desire to resolve the conflict and has recently spoken with President Putin, however Russia’s demands for Ukrainian withdrawal from contested geographical regions may be an area in which Ukraine refuses to concede. Simultaneously, concerns have risen over Chinese military drills and operations around the island of Taiwan. Though the U.S. supports the “One China” policy and does not have formal diplomatic ties with Taiwan, the nation has also committed to providing self-defense materials to Taiwan and maintaining peace in the region. Thus, an escalation of the conflict may necessitate U.S. involvement. Historically, the U.S. has been a large force in cross-country alliances, such as the G7 and NATO, as well as in international organizations such as the OECD. Yet under Trump’s America First goals, it appears that the U.S. is shifting towards a selective multilateralism model, in which it will only participate in international agreements which directly benefit the state. Given the influence of the U.S., a decline in United States multilateral participation may decrease global multilateralism.

Russia

A pressing topic for the United States is the war in Ukraine, and how much of a role the country should have in helping Ukraine defend itself from Russia. When Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, the United States and its NATO allies sent aid to Ukraine and imposed economic sanctions on Russia. Though initially popular with American citizens, three years later, politics and citizens alike differ on whether the U.S. should spend so much. Overall, citizens are fairly evenly split – 29% say that “the U.S. is providing too much support to Ukraine,” while 26% say that “it is the right amount,” according to a poll conducted by Pew Research Center in July 2024 (2024). Similarly, 48% of Americans believe that the U.S. has the responsibility to help Ukraine, while 49% believe that it does not. However, bipartisan splits over Ukraine are vast; 63% of Democrats believe that the U.S. is responsible, while only 36% of Republicans agree. In the years since Russia’s invasion, Americans increasingly do not view the war as a threat to U.S. interests; 50% of those surveyed said yes in 2022, while only 34% said yes in a 2024 survey (ibid). Where partisan interests converge, however, is in the wide public support of continuing economic sanctions on Russia – 66% of Republicans and 77% of Democrats are in favor. The same poll was conducted in November of 2024, and few changes were seen in public opinion since July (Copeland, 2024).

As Americans increasingly disapprove of the aid that is being sent to Ukraine, and view Russia’s invasion as less of a threat to the United States, it seems that U.S. foreign policy must evolve to reflect evolving public opinions. President Donald Trump has mentioned ending the war in Ukraine as a top priority, and conditions appear to be shifting towards a possible resolution (Berzina, 2025). Recently, Trump stated that he spoke with Russian President Putin, the first conversation between a U.S. president and Putin since Russia’s invasion in 2022 (Mason et al., 2025). Trump’s administration has also indicated that the U.S. may use harsher economic sanctions to force Russia to negotiate. In addressing American citizen concern on U.S. aid spending on Ukraine, it appears that Ukraine will allow U.S. access to their rare earth and minerals in compensation (ibid). Yet, the end of war will not be possible without concessions from one or both sides. Putin has demanded that Ukraine concede its four territories controlled by Russia and abandon its goals to join NATO to end the war. This may be an unlikely resolution.

February 28, 2025: Trump and Zelenskyy Meet

A recent meeting between Trump and Ukrainian President Zelenskyy completely shifted dynamics between the United States and Ukraine (The White House, 2025). The two presidents discussed the rare earth minerals deal, stating that this will have positive impacts for both countries. The United States will benefit monetarily from access to rare earths, Trump said, and part of the revenue generated from rare earth sales will be placed in a fund for Ukraine as well. In discussions of plans to end the war, Trump expressed optimism about the possibility for a ceasefire agreement between Ukraine and Russia. Zelenskyy agreed on the necessity of a deal, but argued that Ukraine cannot accept a deal without security guarantees. He cited Russia’s breaking of ceasefire agreements 25 times beginning in 2014 as a need for continued security support from the United States and the European Union. Trump did not commit U.S. security provisions to Ukraine post-deal, stating that the priority should truly be on stopping the war first, then security later. He stated that both sides must make concessions in the deal, which Zelenskyy countered, stating that Russia invaded Ukraine and is attempting to take Ukrainian lands.

Tensions escalated towards the end of the meeting, as Zelenskyy claimed that the United States will feel effects if Russia is not stopped, and Trump claimed that Zelenskyy should be more grateful for the support the U.S. has given Ukraine. Since the meeting, the United States has halted military aid to Ukraine, and it is unclear how long this pause will last, or whether the United States will resume aid (Shalal & Slattery, 2025). Yet simultaneously, Trump has expressed optimism about the U.S. Ukraine rare minerals deal still being on.

Taiwan

Taiwan and China

Taiwan and its relationship with China may also require U.S. intervention, igniting debates on the role of the United States in Taiwanese sovereignty. Though Taiwan is widely recognized as a sovereignly-governed island belonging to China, quests from China for full Taiwan integration, and Taiwanese goals of full independence could lead to direct confrontations. Under the 1992 Consensus, China and Taiwan agreed to a “One China” policy, though both sides have differing opinions on its meaning (Maizland & Fong, 2025). China, the “People’s Republic of China” (PRC) views this as an agreement that both China and Taiwan belong to one China, the PRC, while Taiwan’s KMT party in power viewed it as “one China, different interpretations” (ibid). In 2016, the Democratic Progressive Party entered power in Taiwan, a political party that has not shown explicit support for “One China” as opposed to its previous ruling party, the KMT (ibid). The DPP wants to maintain Taiwan’s independence, causing tensions with China which aims for a complete reunification with Taiwan in the future.

In recent years, tensions have escalated as China has conducted military exercises and operations near the island of Taiwan, in addition to restricting tourism to Taiwan in 2016 (Maizland & Fong, 2025). Any direct aggression from China may necessitate United States interference, leading to concerns for U.S. policymakers. Currently, the United States does not have formal diplomatic ties with Taiwan as it operates under a One China framework (U.S. State Department). Its stance on Taiwan and China is in support for the status quo, and support of peace in the region. Under the Taiwanese Strait Act, the United States provides self-defense support to Taiwan (ibid). Regularly, the U.S. “sails ships through the Taiwan Strait to demonstrate its military presence in the region” (Maizland & Fong, 2025). Furthermore, the U.S. has committed to ensuring that Taiwan has the adequate resources to defend itself against “force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system” (U.S. State Department). However, the state aims to remain neutral and not play a mediating role between China and Taiwan (TECRO, 2025). Yet, under the U.S. goal of peace in the Western Pacific region, the nation may be forced to take action should tensions between China and Taiwan turn to direct confrontation.

Semiconductors

Taiwan’s wealth stems from its semiconductor industry, as it produces chips necessary in technological products utilized by large companies such as Apple through the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) (Lee & Blanchard, 2025). Concerns from both Biden and Trump’s administrations come from a U.S. overreliance on Taiwanese chips. Under Biden’s presidency, Congress passed the CHIPS and Science Act focused on  creating a semiconductor industry in the United States (Maizland & Fong, 2025).  Trump has publicly criticised Taiwan for “stealing” the chip industry, and proposed a 10% tariff on U.S. imports (ibid). Taiwan’s president Lai Ching-te has addressed these U.S. concerns, agreeing to discuss solutions with President Trump. Under the previous Trump administration in 2020, TSMC began a project in Arizona, investing $65 billion to build chip factors (Lee & Blanchard, 2025). Recently, Lai has stated that “democratic countries including the United States should come together to build a global alliance for AI chips and a “democratic supply chain” for advanced chips” (ibid).

Alliances and International Organizations

The United States plays a dominant role in international institutions and alliances, however under President Donald Trump’s “America First” policies, we may see a decrease in multilateralism. Trump may tighten spending on and withdraw from organizations or missions which do not directly benefit the United States. Looking at the Trump administration’s desires for NATO, we can already see this occur.

NATO

The NATO now is stronger and has more funding than the NATO during Trump’s first presidency. Its new members, such as Finland and Sweden, have brought with them new defense strategies and knowledge, as well as more funding (Berzina, 2025). However it is not without its problems. Nations such as the United States find themselves contributing a disproportionate amount of their GDP to the alliance compared to other countries (ibid). Russia’s invasion of Ukraine exposed how reliant Ukraine and NATO is on U.S. funding (Bergman & Martinez, 2024). Though a target has been set for members of the alliance to contribute 2% of their GDP, not all NATO members have done so. These numbers have increased since Trump’s last term – from 4 to 9 – yet that leaves 23 nations which have not reached the target (Berzina, 2025). Trump has indicated a desire for increased defence spending among NATO member states, and even proposed a tier system based on contributions. This system would comprise two tiers – Tier 1 is the countries that have met the 2% GDP target, while Tier 2 is the countries that have not (Bergman & Martinez, 2024). Countries in Tier 2 would receive less resource and aid access than those in Tier 1. However, it is unlikely that such a resolution can pass, as it would go against the foundations of NATO. This proposal illustrates the frustrations of the current U.S. administration with NATO, as Trump feels that the United States is picking up slack for its other members. If the United States were to withdraw from NATO, the organization would be devastated; it will likely take years or decades for member states to rebuild NATO’s “European Pillar” (ibid).

The G7

Similar to NATO, the G7, would also feel a gap were the United States to withdraw. The G7 includes the U.S., UK, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and now the EU since 1981 (Niblett, 2025). Missing in this list is Russia, a member state of the original G7, then called the G8. In 2014 Russia was removed from the G8 after it annexed Crimea from Ukraine (Sevinc, 2025). Now, the G7 collaborates to impose economic sanctions on Russia in hopes of ending the war in Ukraine (Niblett, 2024). The alliance is also focused on China’s rising power, and its alliance with Russia, and its member countries have begun moving their supply chains to South Korea and Australia and out of China (ibid). Recently, Trump announced a desire for Russia’s reinstatement into the G7, claiming it a “mistake” to throw Russia out of the organization, as it was originally the G8 (Reuters, 2025). This is not an indicator of friendly relations between the U.S. and Russia, he says, but rather driven by a desire to return the organization to its original state. Canada rejected this proposition (Sevinc, 2025). The current U.S. conflicts with its alliance, coupled with Trump’s America First goals, signal that the G7 must step away from its overreliance on the United State; historically, the U.S. has been a leader in the G7, and the organization depends on its participation in common economic goals (Butler, 2024).

Global Tax Deal Withdrawal

NATO is not the only organization feeling the effects of Trump’s America First policy goals; Trump recently signed an order to pull out of global tax agreements. In 2021, the OECD set a global minimum tax of 15% to prevent multinational companies from keeping their profits in countries with low or no tax rates (Medina, 2025). Trump’s recent withdrawal from these is to allow the United States the independence to set tax policies that best serve the interests of the United States and its citizens. The Global Tax Deal may lead to double taxation or discriminatory practices for U.S. companies, allowing China to push ahead of the United States, the Trump administration says. Thus, the U.S. withdrawal from the agreement serves as a “recapture[…] [U.S.] sovereignty and economic competitiveness” (Shaw, 2025). Though the OECD has largely been in charge of global taxes for years, the organization’s dominance has been questioned by many of its members. Now, the United States’ decision may lead others to withdraw; already, India is reconsidering its role in the tax agreements (Medina, 2025).

Conclusions

The United States has vested interests in conflicts occurring around Ukraine and Taiwan, in its oppositions to Russia and China. As the war in Ukraine continues, many American citizens have criticized the government for its large aid packages to Ukraine. President Trump has acknowledged these, and taken steps towards discussions with Russia to resolve the war, however talks are in early stages, and it is therefore difficult to determine whether these will be successful. In the Western Pacific region, China’s power demonstrations towards Taiwan have ramped up, threatening a direct confrontation between these. The United States claims a desire for peace in the area, and must carefully choose its actions in defending Taiwan while not playing an active role in the conflict. Though alliances such as NATO and the G7 have benefitted the United States in their common goals against Russia and China, and coordinated efforts to maintain Russian economic sanctions and remove overreliance on China in supply chains, Trump has recently expressed concerns over the disproportionate participation of the U.S. in these compared to other member states. Though NATO comprises 32 countries, only 9 of these have met the 2% GDP spending target, and the U.S. bears a large part of the burden in Ukrainian war assistance. The recent U.S. withdrawal from the OECD’s Global Tax Deal showcases a commitment from the current administration to remove itself from multilateralism and alliances which do not benefit the United States. Moving forward, multilateralism may decrease globally, as nations begin to prioritise their own best self-interests over collaboration.